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Abstract 
British cities have a surprisingly long history of cultural diversity. Recently they have 
become significantly more multicultural, with ‘super-diversity’ emerging in many urban 
neighbourhoods. Public interest in these changes is high, but there has been little research 
assessing their impacts. This paper makes two contributions to the field. First, it assembles 
new data on UK urban areas 2001-6, using an innovative cultural-ethno-linguistic (CEL) 
measure of cultural diversity alongside more traditional measures. Second, it tests links 
between diversity, wages and employment rates at the urban level. As suggested by theory 
and international evidence, I find some positive associations between super-diversity and UK 
urban economic performance. 
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 1. Introduction  
 
This paper explores the economics of cultural diversity in British cities, focusing on the years 
2001-2006 and the emergence of so-called ‘super-diversity’ in some urban areas. It looks at 
the distribution of diversity1 across urban areas in the UK, using new and innovative 
measures based on cultural-ethnic-linguistic (CEL) name classification and scoring. It also 
presents results from cross-sectional analysis of these diversity measures on urban wages and 
employment.  
 
The UK and many other Western societies have a long, sometimes hidden history of 
cultural diversity and multiculturalism (Sassen 2004, Sandu 2004). Over the past few 
decades, these societies have become dramatically more diverse, a process driven both by 
shifts in international migration and by natural change (Putnam 2007). Vertovec (2007, 2006) 
argues that the resulting spread of new communities, languages, religious practices and 
people flows across the UK represents a shift from traditional patterns towards a new ‘super-
diversity’. The effects of bigger, more mixed societies are now of major public and policy 
interest (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah 2010, Caldwell 2009, Aspinall 2009, Simpson and 
Finney 2009, Wolf 2008). However, debates have tended to focus on the short-term impacts 
of migrants on labour markets, public services and community cohesion (Card et al 2009, 
Somerville and Sumption 2009, House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee 2008). There 
has been little research on the broader economics of super-diversity.  
 
In order to understand the economics of cultural diversity in the UK, it is important to 
look at cities and urban economies. There is a simple reason for this: put crudely, cities are 
‘where the diversity is’. Despite more dispersed patterns of migration in recent years, in 
spatial terms cultural diversity remains an urban phenomenon (Champion 2006).  
 
There is good evidence that economic diversity in cities helps support long-term 
economic growth (Jacobs 1970, Duranton and Puga 2001, Glaeser 2008, MIER 2009). 
Furthermore, there is now some suggestive evidence that cultural diversity may also be an 
economic asset at the urban level. At firm level a diverse workforce may make better 
                                                 
1
 For the purposes of this paper I use ‘cultural diversity’, ‘ethnic diversity’ and ‘diversity’ as 
interchangeable terms. Section 3 of this paper discusses these concepts in more detail.  
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decisions and be stronger at ideas generation (Page 2007); at individual level ‘ethnic 
entrepreneurs’ can exploit diasporas to help knowledge spillovers and open up international 
markets (Saxenian and Sabel 2008, Kerr 2008). Given the spatial distribution of diversity, 
these channels are likely to be stronger in urban areas. Urban-level features may also support 
positive effects of diversity: a more diverse urban population may drive the development of 
new goods and services (Leadbeater 2008), and a diverse urban environment may help attract 
a ‘creative class’ of skilled, liberally-minded employees (Florida 2002).  
 
There is now some international evidence behind these ideas (see Section 4 of this 
paper). However, many of these propositions have yet to be full tested in a UK context. 
Given its continued public and policy salience, it is critical to better understand the 
economics of growing cultural diversity.  
 
The paper makes two main contributions to this growing literature. First, it assembles 
new data on UK urban economies using ONOMAP, a new and fine-grained system of 
cultural-ethnic-linguistic (CEL) name classification, alongside other more  ‘traditional’ 
measures. This produces a very rich set of descriptive statistics, comparing patterns of urban 
cultural diversity and recent changes. Second, the paper tests linkages between cultural 
diversity measures and urban wages and employment rates, using a simple growth model and 
cross-sectional analysis.  The results suggest some positive links between diversity and urban 
economic performance – particularly measures of urban super-diversity. There is a zero or 
negative association between some diversity measures and employment rates, some of which 
may be explained by long term structural changes to urban labour markets.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides key trends and policy 
context. Section three looks at the concept of ‘cultural diversity’ in more detail, and 
introduces the CEL methodology. Section four reviews theory and evidence on the 
economics of cultural diversity, particularly in relation to urban areas. The rest of the paper 
moves into the primary research. Section five outlines the approach, datasets and sample. 
Section six gives the results of the descriptive analysis, and section seven the regression 
results. Section eight concludes.  
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2. The multicultural city in history 
 
Multicultural society and ‘the multicultural city’ are usually seen as new phenomena. In fact, 
their roots often go back for centuries (Sandu 2004). Britain and many other European 
societies share a long history of people movement and demographic change. Migrations 
typically resulted in new minority communities assimilating, to different degrees, into the 
cultural mainstream: ‘even when [new groups] kept their differences, they were members of 
the community: part of the complex, highly heterogeneous ‘we’ of any developed society’ 
(Sassen 2004). Vertovec (2007) chronicles complaints across Medieval Britain that 
‘foreigners were practising their own customs’. By 1867 the Times was arguing that ‘there is 
hardly such a thing as a pure Englishman on this island … our national denomination, to be 
strictly correct, would be a composite of a dozen national titles’ (Sandu 2004). 
 
This ‘complex we’ is usually highly urbanised: cities are the primary sites of cultural 
diversity (Amin 2002). Again, many urban communities have surprisingly deep roots. In his 
history of the city, Peter Ackroyd writes that ‘by the tenth century [London] was populated 
by Cmyric Brythons and Belgae, by remnants of the Gaulish legions, by East Saxons and 
Mercians, by Danes, Norwegians and Swedes, by Franks and Jutes and Angles, all mingled 
and mingling together to form a distinct tribe of ‘Londoners’’ (Ackroyd 2000, quoted in 
Vertovec 2006).  
 
Since the 1970s, Indo- and Chinese-American entrepreneurs have played an important 
role in the growth of Silicon Valley (Saxenian 2006). But the Bay Area has had large 
communities from both countries since the 19th century: Indian migrants started arriving 
from the 1850s onwards, many becoming prominent figures in the Santa Clara valley during 
its first, agricultural phase (Randolph and Erich 2009). Back in the UK, Chinese communities 
in London, Liverpool and Manchester were well established by the end of the 19th century. 
Liverpool’s Chinatown grew up in the 1860s on the back of a regular steamer service to 
Chinese ports: by the 1930s, there were around 20,000 ethnic Chinese living in the city.  
 
The main changes over the past few decades are factors of scale and speed. As the 
global population grows, so does the scale of global mobility (Landry and Wood 2008.) The 
US, historically a  ‘country of immigrants’ (and the descendents of slaves) has also 
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experienced large upturns in net migration from South American countries, South and South 
East Asia (Putnam 2007).  
 
The UK has experienced particularly striking changes. In a recent overview Vertovec 
(2007, 2006) argues that since the early 1990s, there has been a transformative 
‘diversification of diversity’ leading to the emergence of ‘super-diversity’. Vertovec’s 
terminology captures a number of linked changes. At the most basic level, the UK has moved 
from a net exporter of people to a net importer. At the same time, the range of country of 
birth groups in Britain has substantially expanded (Kyambi 2005). As new communities 
form, the number of languages spoken and religions practised has also grown. In 2003, the 
first year data was collected, 10.4% of primary schoolchildren and 8.8% of secondary 
schoolchildren had a first language other than English. By 2009, these had risen to 15.2% and 
11.1% respectively (DCSF 2009). 
 
International migration is a key driver of growing cultural diversity in the UK, but not 
the only one. By mid-2007, net births had overtaken immigration as a source of population 
growth (Office of National Statistics 2008). This includes a rising share of births to mothers 
born outside the UK, and reflects the tendency of new migrants to put down roots in host 
countries, even when economic conditions turn down (CLG 2009b). More broadly, Fanshawe 
and Sriskandarajah (2010) suggest British identities are both multiple and increasingly fluid.  
 
The UK’s cultural diversity is a largely urban phenomenon. England’s migrant and 
minority ethnic populations are largely concentrated in and around London, the conurbations 
and other cities. In 2001 the capital contained 48.2% of England’s non-white population 
(Champion 2006). Schoolchildren in London speak at least 300 different languages at home 
(Gordon et al 2007), and figures for other large cities will  be comparable. As new 
communities settle, they tend to de-concentrate across urban space, moving from inner urban 
areas into suburban neighbourhoods (Simpson and Finney 2009). Vertovec emphasises that 
changes in spatial patterning also inform super-diversity – while urban cores represent the 
largest stocks and inflows minority communities, many suburban and rural areas have seen 
rapid relative change (Vertovec 2007). At the same time better, cheaper technology and 
transport facilitates transnational lifestyles and strengthens diasporas (ibid).  
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2.1 Policy context  
 
Worries about diversity and migration are nothing new. Fearing unrest, in the year 883 King 
Alfred banished the Danes from London, restricting them to land east of the river Lea (Keith 
2005). Elizabeth I issued a proclamation in 1610 ordering the expulsion of ‘negars and 
Blackamoores’ from the capital (Sandu 2004). Sassen points out that all the major European 
countries have centuries-long histories of anti-immigrant sentiment (Sassen 2004). In the 
America of the late 19th and early 20th century, urban communities like New York, Chicago, 
San Francisco and New Orleans were often riven with inter-ethnic conflict as established 
groups – self-described ‘Americans’ – battled with newer arrivals (Sante 1998).  
 
Cultural and ethnic conflicts are often hard to disentangle from other fears about 
class, poverty and access to resources, as the 2001 disturbances in many northern English 
towns illustrates (Cantle 2001). But this has not prevented widespread public and policy 
concerns about the social and economic effects of larger, more diverse communities in the 
UK (Caldwell 2009, Finney and Simpson 2009, Goodhart 2004). Around 80% of Britons say 
that the UK has good relations between different types of people (Landry and Wood 2008). 
Nevertheless, since 2003, ‘race and immigration’ has been one of the top three issues in 
MORI’s monthly omnibus surveys of public opinion (Somerville 2007).  
 
The emergence of Muslim communities in many European cities has provoked 
particularly strong reactions. Cultural conservatives such as Caldwell (2009) raise the 
prospect of a future ‘Eurabia’ dominated by Islamic culture and laws; progressives argue that 
as new communities become established, religion and cultural customs typically evolve or are 
left aside (Kuper 2009, Landry and Wood 2008). In the UK there are periodic concerns about 
‘white flight’ from urban areas – in 2005 Trevor Phillips, head of the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, suggested that Britain was ‘sleepwalking into segregation’, although the 
evidence suggests very little spatial segregation in British cities (Finney and Simpson 2009).  
 
Reflecting these debates, British policy frameworks have evolved in the past 40 years 
– from a broadly multiculturalist approach towards a greater focus on community cohesion 
(CLG 2009a, Landry and Wood 2008). Migration policy has become increasingly orientated 
towards meeting economic goals, attracting skilled workers and capping the supply of others 
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(Somerville 2007). At the same time, however, ‘diversity’ has become a value in its own 
right, particularly in classrooms and workplaces (Aspinall 2009).  
 
 
3. Understanding cultural diversity: measures and bases  
 
This paper seeks to answer two questions. First, how culturally diverse are British cities? 
Second, what are the links between urban cultural diversity and economic performance? To 
answer these satisfactorily, I need to settle a third, prior question: how best to conceptualise 
quantify, ‘cultural diversity’? This section reviews the literature and issues, introducing the 
CEL system used in the rest of the paper.  
 
3.1 What is ‘cultural diversity’?  
 
Defining cultural diversity is extremely challenging. Fundamentally, we are trying to classify 
human distinctiveness, something that tends to resist being pinned down Landry and Wood 
(2008). Culture and ethnicity are ‘context-driven social and psychological concepts’, and so 
are fundamentally difficult to identify and estimate (Aspinall 2009). There are two basic steps 
in attempting to define cultural diversity. The first is to establish a working definition of 
‘cultural identity’; the second is to use this to classify the diversity of identities.  
 
3.2 Cultural identity  
 
At the conceptual level there are three problems for researchers. First, cultural identity is 
multi-dimensional and multi-level: components of identity are commonly assumed to 
comprise kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality and appearance (Bulmer 
1996). As Casey and Dustmann (2009) point out, ‘because ‘identity’ is not a uniquely defined 
concept, its correct measurement in empirical analysis is unclear’.  
 
Second, identity has important elements of self-definition – it is our ‘sense of self’. 
There is general agreement that ‘membership of a … [cultural] group is something that is 
subjectively meaningful to the person concerned’ (Office of National Statistics 2003). 
However, many people (such as the children of immigrants) may not feel they belong 
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uniquely to a single group. Casey and Dustmann (2009) find strong evidence of parental 
influence on identity in a study of German migrants; they also find that while fathers tend to 
‘transmit’ German identity to children, mothers transmit ‘home’ identity, particularly to 
daughters. This suggests limits to the self-definition of identity, and that identities may 
evolve beyond childhood.  
 
Third, both individuals’ sense of identity and categories of ethnic and cultural 
classification tend to change over time. The UK has shifted from crude groupings such as 
‘coloureds’ in the 1960s towards increasingly sophisticated categories today. More 
importantly, individual identities are also fluid, with certain aspects becoming more or less 
salient as groups assimilate. Manning and Roy (2007) find that age, years of residence and 
years of education have a positive association with the strength of British identity. Evolving 
aspects of identity within communities help shape that community’s view of itself. 
Discussing the evolution of cultural identity within French Muslim communities, sociologist 
Olivier Roy uses the concept of ‘formatage’ – a dynamic process in which aspects of 
‘traditional’ cultural or religious behaviour, typically those of first generation migrants, are 
reshaped by subsequent generations to reflect new socio-cultural milieux (Roy, in Kuper 
2009).  
 
3.3 Cultural classification 
 
Almost all attempts to classify and measure identity will be imperfect.  At the extreme, if we 
believe that individual identity is essentially self-ascribed, it becomes very difficult to ascribe 
behaviour to identity – especially aspects of identity that are malleable, such as nationality or 
religion (Casey and Dustmann 2009). Most researchers therefore look for objective proxies 
for cultural identity (Mateos et al 2009). Researchers are getting to grips with many of the 
conceptual challenges (Aspinall 2009). However, existing datasets tend to be relatively crude, 
particularly those relying on a single ‘tick-box’ approach (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah 
2010).  
 
There are two major practical criteria for diversity proxies (Aspinall 2009). The first 
is the need for high ‘granularity’, to distinguish different groups at a high level of detail. The 
second is the ‘validity / utility tradeoff’: we need to balance granularity with the need to link 
smaller groups into larger ones.  
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These are not simply theoretical concerns: multi-dimensional, multi-level 
classifications seem to help explain economic and social outcomes. A recent major study 
found that at cross-country level, high-level ethno-linguistic cleavages are good predictors of 
civil conflict and redistributive tendencies; finer-grained, sub-national distinctions matter 
more for economic growth and the provision of public goods (Desmet el al 2009).  
 
The two most common proxies for diversity are country of birth and ethnicity (the 
main UK classifications are set out in Appendices 2 and 3). For UK-focused analysis, neither 
is entirely robust. Country of birth data is available at high levels of detail, but provides 
limited granularity: in the 2001 Census only half the ethnic minority population was born 
outside the UK (Mateos et al 2007). ONS ethnicity classifications, which divide the 
population into 16 groups, hide substantial variation within groups and bear little relation to 
actual norms or socio-economic outcomes (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah 2010, Mateos et al 
2009). Ethnicity classes also focus on ‘visible minorities’, ignoring the recent growth of 
‘white other’ communities.  
 
3.4 The CEL approach  
 
Against this backdrop, cultural-ethnic-linguistic (CEL) name classification is a promising 
way forward (see Mateos 2007 for a review of recent research). CEL approaches have a 
number of advantages. First, CEL classifications are both objective and multidimensional, 
reflecting religion, geography, language and kinship. Second, they are available at different 
levels of aggregation, reflecting the higher-level connections between specific groups. Third, 
CEL methodologies use probability scoring to reflect the dynamic nature of cultural identity. 
 
Mateos and colleagues (2007) have developed ONOMAP, a CEL-based taxonomy of 
names for the UK. They examine forename and surname characteristics using names from 
UK Electoral Register. These are then grouped together, combining information on 
geographical area, religion, language and language family associated with forename / 
surname combinations. This gives 185 basic CEL categories, which can be aggregated at 
different levels of detail (larger ‘sub-groups’, and even larger ‘groups’). Crucially, rather than 
assign each combination to a specific CEL group, the researchers apply probability scores to 
each forename / surname combination. This helps deal with the large numbers of names with 
multiple cultural origins; the historically fuzzy boundaries of many states (e.g. Germany and 
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the Netherlands), and the alteration/adoption of names traditional to the British Isles. More 
detail is given in Appendix 1.  
 
ONOMAP thus allows us to break down both the historical dynamics of established 
UK communities – with separate groupings for ‘English’, ‘Welsh’, ‘Scottish’ and ‘Celtic’ – 
and provides fine-grained detail on more recent communities, such as Afrikaans and Black 
South African migrants. It also allows us to usefully disaggregate complex groups, such as 
the British ‘Muslim community’, into a number of distinct geographical, ethnic and linguistic 
sets. 2 
 
 
4. The economics of cultural diversity: reviewing the evidence  
 
4.1 Cultural diversity and cities: approaches 
 
The literature on diversity and urban places is large and itself diverse. It includes historical 
analysis, such as the history of ‘creative cities’ (Hall 1998) or the role of migrants in 
developing the 19th century Atlantic Economic (Crafts and Venables 2001); ethnic group 
studies, covering the prospects and progress of (for example) Jewish, Italian and Caribbean 
communities in the US and UK (Sandu 2004, Sante 1998); the post-colonial literature, 
exploring diasporas, the development of cultural identity and the changing nature of ‘home’ 
(Urry 2000, Gilroy 1992); urban sociology, exploring related ideas of the post-colonial, 
cosmopolitan, transnational or ‘mongrel’ city (Keith 2005, Sandercock 2003, Smith 2001); a 
number of studies looking at social capital and community cohesion (Putnam 2007, Alesina 
and La Ferrara 2004); cross-country studies examining the role of ethnic fractionalisation in 
economic and social development (Collier and Hoeffler 1998); and a wide-ranging economic 
literature covering organisational performance, labour markets and human capital, 
entrepreneurship, innovation, productivity and the cost of living (e.g. Bellini et al 2008, 
Wadhwa et al 2007, Card 2007, Saxenian 2006, Ottaviano and Peri 2006 and 2005, Saiz 
2003, Lazear 1998, Borjas 1994).  
                                                 
2
 One significant drawback of ONOMAP is that it is unable to distinguish American, 
Canadian, Australian and New Zealand CEL types on the basis of name alone, since many of 
these names will also be common to British and European populations. In this paper, names 
common to many countries are placed in the ‘INTERNATIONAL’ subgroup. 
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Within the economic strand there are two major preoccupations. First, there is an 
extensive literature on migration-related labour supply shocks, and their impacts at local and 
national level (see Dustmann et al 2008 for a recent review). In practice, although British 
migrants’ human capital is similar to British-born workers, recent migrants have tended to 
cluster in ‘hard to fill’ jobs at the margins on the labour market (Manacorda et al 2006). 
Although initial impacts on natives may be minimal, long term effects may be more 
substantial (Nathan 2009).  
 
Second, in the development studies field a number of country-level studies have 
looked at the role of ‘ethno-linguistic fractionalisation’ in affecting long term economic 
development, particularly in some African countries. Ranis (2009) reviews the literature, 
suggesting that the low population density of some countries in sub-Saharan Africa makes it 
even harder to generate trust relationships across ethno-linguistic groups – conversely, 
smaller, more highly populated Asian countries have been better able to foster the necessary 
social capital. Specifically, fractionalisation reduces trust and increases transactions costs 
(Collier 1998). 
 
In order to understand the economics of cultural diversity at urban level, it is 
important to look beyond both of these debates. To do this I develop a simple theoretical 
framework, using perspectives from growth theory and new economic geography. I then 
populate the framework with evidence from the UK and elsewhere.  
 
4.2 Cities and long-term growth  
 
Classical models of economic growth predict the long run convergence of countries and 
regions. By contrast, endogenous growth theories highlight the importance of human capital 
and knowledge in advancing the technological frontier. Subsequent productivity gains drive 
long term growth rates (Romer 1990). National and regional differences in knowledge 
creation and diffusion thus help explain spatial disparities.  
 
In these accounts of long term growth, cities play a number of important and well-
established roles. Agglomeration economies help raise firms’ and workers’ productivity. 
Duranton and Puga (2003) summarise these as ‘matching’, ‘sharing’ and ‘learning’ effects. In 
particular, cities facilitate knowledge spillovers and ideas flow, by supporting face to face 
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interactions and other ‘learning’ economies. Jacobs (1970) suggests cities offer dynamic 
productivity gains to firms by enabling innovation. Recent structural shifts in national 
economies – in particular, an increased share of employment in services and ‘knowledge-
intensive’ activity – have helped sort employers and skilled workers across urban areas 
(Overman and Rice 2008). Productivity gains driven by agglomeration help raise nominal 
wages and (often) employment rates; conversely, urban crowding in growing cities raises 
costs and eats into real wages (Combes et al 2005).  
 
4.3 Diversity and growth  
 
New growth theories also suggest various roles for cultural diversity. First, diversity may 
influence knowledge creation at the firm level. Berliant and Fujita (2009) model a system of 
knowledge creation, in which worker heterogeneity accelerates ideas generation via 
production complementarities. Specifically, ‘cognitively diverse’ teams leverage a wider pool 
of perspectives: cultural diversity is a good proxy for cognitive diversity (Page 2007).3  
 
Second, diverse firms may have better access to new ideas and markets, by leveraging 
international networks and diasporas. Specifically, diasporas reduce information and 
communication costs (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2006).  
 
Third, migrants themselves act as mobile carriers of knowledge. Migration decisions 
reflect both expected returns and the taste for risk-taking. So migrants may be highly 
entrepreneurial, and more likely to look for and develop new ideas (Wadhwa et al 2007). 
Ethnic entrepreneurs can also act as ‘reputational intermediaries’, forging partnerships and 
helping markets access (Saxenian and Sabel 2008). 
 
Against this, there are three potentially negative effects of diversity on growth. First, 
in the short term cultural diversity may trigger higher communication and transactions costs 
(Collier 1998). Second, diverse groups may be less likely to trust each other, so that decision-
                                                 
3
 Page’s Diversity Prediction Theorem suggests that given a group of predictive models, the 
greater the diversity of modellers, the smaller the chances of error. This also implies that in 
some circumstances, the diversity of the problem-solving group is more important than 
individual talent. Cultural diversity (analogous to Page’s ‘identity diversity’) is related to 
cognitive diversity, since different backgrounds and experiences are likely to generate 
different views and ideas. Various empirical studies confirm this.  
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making and knowledge-sharing may be sub-optimal (Alesina and La Ferrara 2004).  Third, 
cultural diversity may create excess preference diversity, with conflicting desires and choices 
within teams (Page 2007). In empirical studies, the net benefits of team-level diversity appear 
to outweigh costs.  
 
4.4 Cities, diversity and growth  
 
There are three reasons why the urban economics of cultural diversity may be particularly 
important. First, cultural diversity is highly urbanised. Second, many of the diversity-growth 
channels are most prevalent in ‘knowledge-intensive’ firms and other institutions such as 
universities, which tend to have a predominantly urban footprint (Page 2007).  
 
Third, diversity-growth effects may amplify, and be amplified by agglomeration 
effects  (Berliant and Fujita 2009).  For example, if social diversity contributes to economic 
diversity, it may help foster knowledge spillovers across sectors (Jacobs 1970). Specifically, 
large and diverse urban populations are more likely to demand a greater variety of goods and 
services, particularly in non-traded sectors. This will be driven both by the presence of new 
communities, and in some cases by shifting preferences in the majority population (Gordon et 
al 2007).  
  
Taken together, diversity-growth effects in urban areas should lead to higher wages 
and employment rates in more culturally diverse cities. Set against this, social and political 
impacts of higher diversity may have a negative impact on economic outcomes. More diverse 
urban environments may exhibit lower levels of social capital and trust (Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2004). If this leads to under-provision of public goods, this may limit productivity 
gains from agglomeration. At the limit, political / social unrest may affect firms’ and 
workers’ location decisions.  
 
4.5 Cities, diversity and growth: evidence base  
 
There is some suggestive evidence linking urban diversity and economic growth. Page (2007) 
reviews the evidence on diverse firms, concluding that there is a small but significant 
‘diversity advantage’ in problem-solving situations – short term costs are outweighed by 
longer term benefits. Some studies report reduced employee co-operation in the short run, 
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and stress the importance of management setting common organisation-wide goals (Williams 
and O’Reilly 1998, quoted in Page). Firms based around team work and focused on 
‘knowledge-intensive’ problem-solving are most likely to be benefit. Studies also suggest a 
strong overlap between cognitive and cultural diversity.  
 
US city-level evidence suggests that long term, increases in cultural diversity are 
linked to both productivity and price gains in American cities, so that real welfare effects are 
close to neutral (Ottaviano and Peri 2006, Sparber 2006, Saiz 2003). UK panel studies of 
urban areas suggest similar productivity-driven wage gains, alongside employment losses for 
lower-skilled workers (Nathan 2009).   
 
There is some evidence the co-location of migrant inventors makes a difference to 
levels of urban innovation (Hunt 2008, Peri 2007, Saxenian 2006). Several studies also find 
that migrant networks also facilitate international links and reduce trade costs (Peri and 
Requena 2009, Saxenian and Sabel 2008). Saxenian (2006) provides detailed evidence on the 
roles of migrant and ethnic diasporas in the Silicon Valley area (Saxenian 2006) Similarly, 
Kerr’s analysis of international patent citations suggests that ethnic research communities in 
the US, who tend to be heavily urbanised, play a critical role in generating and exporting new 
ideas (Kerr 2008). At the other end of the economy, immigration is positively associated with 
an increased range of restaurants in California (Mazzolari and Neumark 2009). However, 
overall levels of ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’ seem to vary greatly by group, country and 
community class structures (Gordon et al 2007, Nakhaise et al 2009).  
 
Some studies imply social and political costs to rising urban diversity. Putnam (2007) 
finds some evidence of reductions in bonding social capital in more diverse US urban 
neighbourhoods.  A recent study of EU countries by Card and colleagues (2009) found that 
concerns about immigration focused on perceived threats to amenities and public goods. 
However, both Putnam and Card (2007) suggest that the long term benefits of cultural 
diversity outweigh any short term costs.   
 
4.6 Diversity and a Creative Class? 
 
An alternative view is suggested by Richard Florida (2002). In this model, urban economies 
are increasingly dominated by a ‘Creative Class’ of skilled workers with strong preferences 
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for cultural diversity. Open and tolerant cities attract the Creative Class, improving their 
human capital mix and attracting new investment. This implies that diverse cities might have 
stronger economic performance primarily because of the Creative Class, with cultural 
diversity contributing nothing directly. In practice, the Creative Class performs poorly in both 
US (Glaeser 2005) and UK contexts (Nathan 2008a). Significantly, there is little UK 
evidence that a single ‘Creative Class’ exists – skilled workers have a range of location 
preferences covering city centres, suburbs and rural locations. 
 
 
5. Data and sample  
 
There is little UK evidence on the issues just discussed. To help fill the gap, I build a pooled 
cross-section of 79 UK urban areas for the years 2001-6. The aim is to look at patterns of 
cultural diversity in the context of major changes during the 1990s, and to reflect the 
emergence of ‘super-diversity’ in the years following 2001.  
 
5.1 Data sources 
 
My main datasets are the UK Electoral Register and the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
Electoral data provides the main raw input for ONOMAP and is kindly provided by Pablo 
Mateos at CASA, UCL. The version of ONOMAP I am using has been designed for analysis 
at the urban level, and therefore provides information for 67 CEL ‘subgroups’. CEL types 
with very small UK urban populations are aggregated into the larger subgroup units.4 In a 
few cases, geographically disparate groups have been aggregated: full details are provided in 
Appendix 1.   
 
CEL classification systems require large databases of names (Mateos 2007). Raw data 
for ONOMAP is drawn from Electoral Registers between 2001 and 2006, with additional 
data provided by Experian’s ‘Consumer Dynamics’ database (Mateos et al 2007). The 
structure of the names data puts some limits on its use.  First, since 2001 UK residents have 
been able to opt out of the publicly available version of the Register. The raw data highlights 
                                                 
4
 The complete ONOMAP taxonomy includes 185 CEL types and 68 subgroups. See Mateos 
et al 2007 for details.  
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deregisters, but does not identify which are genuine opt-outs and which are simply moves 
from one constituency to another. As a result, a number of records in the raw data may be 
duplicates. The ONOMAP team have performed extensive de-duplication of 2001-6 data, 
minimising this risk. Second, the Register is only provided as a continuous database – so that 
it is not possible to take yearly snapshots from the cleaned aggregate data. Therefore CEL 
information is pooled together for 2001 through 2006 inclusive.  
 
CEL data is supplemented by demographic, social and economic information from the 
Labour Force Survey and ONS mid-year population estimates. The LFS is the best single 
source of information on demographic/cultural characteristics and economic outcomes at 
urban level. I restrict observations to the LFS working age population (16-64 for men, 16-59 
for women), and for simplicity drop observations from Northern Ireland.  
 
The relatively small size of the LFS raises the risk of measurement error when used 
below regional level (Dustmann et al 2005). I am using the survey at sub-regional level, 
which best corresponds to a local spatial economy. To safeguard the sample against error I 
use LFS microdata5 to construct a panel of Travel to Work Areas (2001 TTWAs), using a 
postcode share weighting system to aggregate local authority-level averages.6 TTWAs have 
the additional benefits of being designed to represent largely self-contained local labour 
markets, and are regarded as good proxies for a spatial economy.  
 
                                                 
5
 From the ONS Virtual Microdata Lab (VML). The quarterly LFS samples around 60,000 
households. Each quarter consists of five overlapping ‘waves’, with an 80% overlap within 
that quarter. As per ONS recommendations, to ensure a sample of unique individuals I keep 
only observations from waves 1 and 5 in each quarter. I then pool the remaining data to 
produce calendar years. This approach gives me c.120,000 individual-level observations per 
year, approximately 517 per TTWA. This will be considerably higher for both total and 
migrant sample in the final panel, which is restricted to urban areas only.  
6
 I aggregate individual-level data to local authority-level averages, and then aggregate these 
to TTWA-level using postcode shares. Local Authority District (LAD) boundaries are not 
congruent with TTWA boundaries, so straightforward aggregation is not possible. Using the 
November 2008 National Postcode Sector Database (NSPD), I calculate the number of 
postcodes in each 2001 TTWA and in each of its constituent LADs. I then calculate each 
LAD’s ‘postcode share’ of the relevant TTWAs’ total postcodes. For each TTWA, shares 
sum to one.  Shares are then used to construct TTWA-level averages from the relevant LAD-
level averages.   
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I restrict the analysis to ‘primary urban’ TTWAs where the sample sizes are biggest. 
As with ONOMAP data, I pool all years for the main regressions. The end result is a pooled 
cross-section of 79 observations covering the years 2001-6 inclusive.  
 
5.2 Diversity variables  
 
My main measure of cultural diversity is the ONOMAP CEL classification, which covers 67 
urban-level subgroups. From this, I construct Fractionalisation Indices of cultural diversity. 
Fractionalisation Indices are derived from the Herfindahl Index of industrial concentration, 
and are widely used in the economics of diversity literature following a number of studies in 
the wider literature (e.g. Ottaviano and Peri 2006, Easterley and Levine 1997, Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2004).  For group i in area c in year t, the group’s score on the Index is given by:  
 
FRACict = 1 – ∑i [SHAREict]2        (1) 
 
Where SHARE is i’s share of the total area population.  The Index measures the probability 
that two individuals in an area come from different country of birth groups. The Index is 
helpful in that it reflects both the number of different groups in an area and their relative 
sizes. Specifically, it takes the value 0 when everyone is in the same country of birth group 
and 1 when each individual is in a different group; it takes the value 1-1/c when c groups are 
of equal size.7 
 
I make two Fractionalisation Indices. The first Index looks at the distribution of all 67 
name sub-groups, and is a measure of the size and distribution of the UK urban population. 
The second Index covers the 20% of names ascribed to groups not classified as English, 
Celtic8, Welsh or Scottish geographical origin. It puts greater weight on recent migrant and 
minority communities, and thus acts as a rough ‘Index of Urban Super-Diversity’. It is 
important to note that the intention here is not to make a judgement on the inherent 
                                                 
7
 If groups are of equal size, in theory the maximum value of the Index will be (1 – 1/67) = 
0.985 (3dp). In practice the maximum Index is often 1 due to approximation in the 
aggregation process. 
8
 ‘Celtic’ names are those common across Irish, Scottish and Welsh populations.  
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‘Britishness’ of names, but rather to use geography as a proxy for capturing some of the more 
recent patterns of population change.9  
 
For comparison, I also construct Indices using country of birth and ethnicity data 
taken from the LFS. For the former I use the LFS variable CRYOX, which provides 103 
consistent birth country categories, of which I use 101 (see Appendix 2).10 For ethnicity I use 
the ETHCEN15 variable, which follows 2001 Census classifications and covers 15 high-level 
groups (see Appendix 3 for more details).  
 
 
6. Descriptive analysis 
 
I set out comprehensive descriptive statistics in Tables 1 – 8, covering the set of 79 urban 
TTWAs over the period 2001-6. Table 1 presents summary statistics. Tables 2– 4 break down 
the various diversity measures by area, focusing on the urban areas of greatest cultural 
diversity; tables 5-8 look at the largest groups.  
 
6.1 Summary statistics  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics covering demographic characteristics, economic 
performance measures and information on population density, industrial and economic 
structure. My two economic performance variables are average hourly wages and average 
employment rates. These are largely similar across all workers, UK-born workers, migrants 
and minority ethnic groups. However, wages are slightly lower for minority ethnic groups 
compared to the urban working-age population as a whole. Economic activity and 
employment rates are also slightly lower than average for migrants and minority ethnic 
                                                 
9
 ONOMAP combines information on forenames and surnames, geographical area, religion, 
language and language family associated with forename / surname combinations. In this case, 
I am using one piece of information – geographical area associated with name types – to 
crudely divide the set of names. The matching process is not perfect. For example, the 
‘ENGLISH’ subgroup also includes some names from the smaller ‘BRITISH SOUTH 
AFRICAN’ and ‘MALTESE’ type categories. Conversely, the ‘NORTHERN IRISH’ type 
cannot be included because my data is at subgroup level.  
10
 I drop 102 (at sea / in the air) and 103 (stateless).  
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group, although if these groups are out of work, they are less likely to be long term 
unemployed.  
 
Diversity measures throw up two striking points. First, as measured by CEL sub-
groups, average levels of urban cultural diversity are considerably higher than using 
‘traditional’ measures such as country of birth. Specifically, the mean of the CEL 
Fractionalisation Index is 0.416 with minimum 0.197, compared to other means of 0.28 (ONS 
ethnicity) and 0.143 (country of birth). This reflects the richer, multi-dimensional nature of 
diversity as recorded through ONOMAP.  
 
Second, as a result the CEL measure helps to highlight urban super-diversity – with 
majority name subgroups removed, the average value of the Index is 0.826, with London 
scoring the maximum of 0.946. Within-group Indices of country of birth and ethnicity also 
have much higher means (0.898 and 0.749 respectively).   
 
6.2 Urban cultural diversity by area 
 
Table 2 ranks urban areas’ cultural diversity by CEL name subgroup. The left hand columns 
give results for the full Index, the right hand columns scores for the super-diversity Index. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the full Index suggests that Scottish cities are more culturally diverse 
than London, with the biggest Welsh cities only fractionally behind the capital. Index scores 
are higher the larger the number of groups, and the more even their sizes. London has a very 
large number of distinct cultural communities, but with widely varying sizes (Kyambi 2005). 
By contrast, Scottish and Welsh cities will tend to have fewer groups of fairly even size, with 
large, historic populations of ‘Celtic’ and ‘English’ CEL origin alongside majority ‘Scottish’ 
and ‘Welsh’ groups. This is borne out in the right hand column, which shows ranking by 
areas once ‘English’, ‘Scottish’, ‘Welsh’ and ‘Celtic’ groups are removed. Without these 
name group populations, CEL-based rankings look closer to intuition, as well as more 
established diversity measures.  
 
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate change over the sample period, using indicative measures of 
diversity based on country of birth and ethnicity. Reflecting national trends, migrant and 
minority diversity in urban areas has risen over the study period; the most diversity cities in 
2001 have also all increased their migrant population share. There has been little change in 
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relative positions over time: measured by country of birth, the most diverse cities in Britain 
remain places like London, Bradford, Birmingham, Leicester, Slough, Luton and Bedford. 
There have been a few notable climbers however, such as Oxford, Cambridge and 
Manchester – all cities that have markedly increased their student populations in recent years.  
 
6.3 Urban cultural diversity by group  
 
Tables 5 and 6 give information on the major CEL name subgroups. As expected, 
‘English’, ‘Celtic’, ‘Scottish’ and ‘Welsh’ country-origin subgroups make up over 88% of 
names in UK urban areas (table 5). Beyond this, ONOMAP data provides much finer 
disaggregation of groups than country of birth or ONS ethnicity-based rankings, and helps 
reflect the super-diversity now present in many urban areas (table 6). For example, 
ONOMAP also shows in some detail how South and South East Asian-origin communities 
break down across UK cities, as well as highlighting both established minorities (such as 
Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jewish communities) and newer arrivals (such as Polish, Afrikaans 
and Black South African groups).  
 
Some of the CEL subgroups aggregate a number of smaller populations at the urban 
level – for example, ‘SOUTH ASIAN’ captures several groups including ‘Asian Caribbean’, 
Guyanese and Kenyan Asian communities, Tamils and Bhutanese. Equally, the ‘AFRICAN’ 
subgroup includes communities from Benin, Botswana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Senegal and 
Zaire.  
 
These tables also illustrate the complexity of constructions like the ‘British Muslim 
community’, which turns out to incorporate disparate groups from Pakistan, Kashmir, 
Somalia, Iran, the Balkans, Sudan, Malaysia and Central Asian Republics.   
 
Tables 7 and 8 provide some illustrative dynamics, using country of birth and 
ethnicity measures from 2001 – 2006.  Germany, India, Pakistan and Ireland consistently 
form the largest migrant communities among the urban working-age population (table 7). The 
2001 figure also includes many ‘new migrant communities’ that developed in urban Britain 
over the 1990s – notably those from Zimbabwe, Poland, South Africa and Hong Kong. Many 
of these continued to grow during the 2000s, particularly Polish and Zimbabwean migrant 
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communities. The 2006 figure also illustrates the rapid growth of migrant communities from 
the former Soviet Union and Central / Eastern countries which acceded to the EU in 2004.  
 
Table 8 provides similar information by ethnic group. The figures for 2001 and 2006 
show rapid growth in ‘other’-related categories, which have all either doubled or tripled their 
population share in urban areas. This illustrates the shortcomings of the present ethnicity 
classifications for capturing the true cultural diversity of British cities.  
 
 
7. Regression analysis  
 
Using the dataset, I test for linkages between patterns of cultural diversity and economic 
performance in UK cities. I set up a parsimonious model linking urban economic outcomes to 
diversity and a range of demographic, economic and spatial controls. I briefly discuss the 
estimation strategy, then highlight the main findings.  
 
7.1 Estimation strategy  
 
My estimation strategy is an example of the spatial correlations approach widely used in the 
migration and diversity literature (e.g. Dustmann et al 2005, Ottaviano and Peri 2006). The 
model exploits local variations in levels of cultural diversity and in the economic outcomes of 
interest. For TTWA i, the model is given by:  
 
 Yi = bDIVi + DEMic + ECONid + eSPATi  + e        (2) 
 
Y is either the log of average hourly wages or the log of average employment rates, in each 
case for the working-age population. The variable of interest is DIV, which is a 
Fractionalisation Index of CEL subgroups (country of birth and ONS ethnic group Indices are 
included for comparison).   
 
DEM represents a set of demographic controls (share of workers 24 and under, share 
of female workers). Both of these should be negatively correlated with wages. The youth 
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measure is likely to be negatively related to employment, although the share of female 
workers may be positively linked.  
 
ECON is a set of economic structure controls (share of workers with degrees, share of 
workers in manufacturing sectors, share of jobless who are long term unemployed). The first 
of these should be positively related to wages, employment and prices. The second should be 
positively related to employment rates. The third should be negatively related to wages and 
employment (in particular).  
 
SPAT is given by logged population density, measured as total population over 
surface area. This is a simple device for capturing agglomeration economies, and is likely to 
have a positive relationship with wages. I estimate in OLS on the pooled cross-section of 79 
observations (76 for CEL models), using HAC standard errors. The descriptive analysis 
shows that London is the outlier in terms of both cultural diversity and economic 
performance: so I run models with and without the capital.  
 
Data constraints force a number of compromises. As my dataset is cross-sectional, I 
am relying purely on spatial variation and am unable to fit year or area dummies. However, 
the model passes diagnostic tests for fit, collinearity and spatial autocorrelation, and by 
pooling so many years together I minimise the risk that a single year drives the results.  More 
seriously, robust causality checks are unavailable: the sample structure means that I am 
unable to construct any of the usual instruments11 for all my main variables of interest. This is 
problematic given the spatial correlations approach (Altonji and Card 2001, Borjas 1994).  
 
7.2 Results  
 
Regression results are set out in full in tables 9 – 12. Each table sets out estimates for wage or 
employment models, by each set of diversity measures (CEL, country of birth, ethnic 
groups). In each case specification (1) gives the sample bivariate correlation between DIV 
and the dependent variable of interest; specification (2) gives results for controls; 
specification (3) gives results for the full model; specification (4) fits the model without 
including London.  
                                                 
11
 For example, time lags, ‘migrant gateway’ or shift-share instruments. For further 
discussion on causality and instrument strategies see Nathan 2009 or Card 2007. 
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Across both dependent variables and measures of DIV, R2 is consistently between 0.7 
and 0.8. R2 with controls only is around 0.6-0.7; controls are all of the magnitude and sign 
expected. While some of this is likely to be driven by collinearity (see above), the 
consistency of fit statistics suggests the model is picking up some genuine variation in the 
data.   
 
Tables 9 and 10 give the main results of the analysis. For the fractionalisation index 
of all name subgroups, diversity is insignificant on wages (with coefficients close to zero). 
Conversely, there is a small negative link to employment rates: the coefficient of DIV is -
0.131, significant at 1%, implying that a 10 percentage point rise in the Index is linked to a 
1.31% fall in average urban employment rates.  By contrast, the Index of super-diversity – 
excluding the ‘English’, ‘Welsh’, ‘Scottish’ and ‘Celtic’ origin subgroups – turns up strong 
positive associations with both wages and employment rates. The coefficients of DIV are 
0.246 (wages) and 0.105 (employment), both significant at 5%.  
 
In comparison, the Fractionalisation Indices of country of birth and ethnic group turn 
up strong positive associations with wages, but no significant association with employment 
rates (tables 11 and 12). As a cross check I regress Fractionalisation Indices of migrant and 
minority populations on wages and employment. Results are not shown here but are non-
significant in each case.  
 
I run three simple robustness checks. First, removing London from the sample 
changes the numbers slightly in a few cases. For CEL and ethnicity models, results are 
broadly the same. For country of birth models, coefficients of DIV are generally larger when 
London is left out. There seems to be a ‘migrant effect’ on employment rates in London: 
excluding the capital raises the coefficient of DIV from 0.088 to 0.150 (and is now significant 
at 5%).  
 
Second, I remove the eight most common outliers12. Results are not shown here, but 
again make little difference to the overall pattern. Finally, I test for the influence of long term 
                                                 
12
 These are Barnsley, Burnley, Chelmsford, Exeter, Hartlepool, Hastings, London and 
Southend.  
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economic change by excluding 20 ‘de-industrialising’ cities13, taken from Turok and Edge 
(1999). All of these locations lost substantial employment during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
and many will have continued to do so into the 2000s. Removing so many locations reduces 
the sample to around 50 observations, and removes many of the most diverse urban areas, so 
results (not shown here) need cautious interpretation. Wage models are essentially 
unaffected; for employment, the CEL Index is unaffected, while the Index of super-diversity 
now has a much larger positive coefficient (0.276, significant at 1%). This is a puzzling 
result, which may be partly the result of sampling error. Further research with larger datasets 
is needed.  
 
 
8. Discussion  
 
The UK has become more culturally diverse over the last decade and a half. A wider range of 
diaspora groups, languages and religions, as well as a greater fluidity of identities, has 
contributed to a new sense of super-diversity. British cities are where most of this change is 
taking place: super-diversity is a largely urban phenomenon.   
 
Public and policy interest in these issues is high, but there is surprisingly little 
research on the economic and social impacts of super-diversity. In part, this is because 
measuring and quantifying ‘cultural diversity’ beyond broad trends is extremely challenging. 
This paper makes two contributions to filling these gaps. First, it makes use of a rich and 
innovative set of diversity measures, and develops a new dataset of UK cities for the years 
2001-6. Second, it tests links between cultural diversity, wages and employment, comparing 
results across a range of diversity proxies.   
 
The analysis throws up a number of messages. First, when using appropriate measures 
such as ONOMAP, it turns out that urban Britain is more diverse than we might imagine. 
Descriptives for Scottish and Welsh cities, in particular, illustrate the long history of the 
multicultural city in the UK. Second, not only is cultural diversity highly urbanised, it is 
                                                 
13
 These are Birmingham, Clydeside (Glasgow and Lanarkshire TTWAs), West Yorkshire 
(Leeds and Bradford), Merseyside (Liverpool and Wirral), London, Manchester, South 
Yorkshire (Sheffield and Rotherham), Bristol, Cardiff, Coventry, Doncaster, Edinburgh, 
Hull, Leicester, Nottingham, Plymouth, Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland and Wigan. 
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likely to remain so. Across a number of measures, UK urban areas increased their ‘diversity 
share’ between 2001-6, and more recent evidence suggests this will continue (CLG 2009b).  
 
Third, the analysis sheds new light on the emergence of super-diversity, in contrast 
with the ‘traditional patterns’ of the 1950s-1980s. New country of birth and ethnic groups 
grew in the years from 2001; ONOMAP also helps us makes sense of the complex regional, 
religious and linguistic patterns of urban population mix.  
 
Fourth, the regression analysis suggests some positive links between super-diversity 
and both wages and employment at the urban level. More broadly, diversity as measured by 
ONOMAP finds no link between diversity and urban wages (although alternate regressions 
using birth country and ethnicity groups do find a link). I also find some negative 
associations between DIV and employment rates. Robustness checks suggest these may be 
partly explained by factors not fully captured in this simple model, such as long-term de-
industrialisation and institutional shifts in urban labour markets (see also Nathan 2009).  
 
These results are drawn from a single, relatively small cross-section. I am unable to 
infer causality, and legitimate concerns could be raised about sample size. As such, my 
findings have to be taken as suggestive, and coefficients as upper bounds. However, they are 
in line with a growing body of international evidence suggesting some economic benefits of 
cultural diversity, particularly in urban areas.  
 
There are a number of fruitful areas for further research. In particular, collecting UK 
panel data would allow more robust analysis and the potential for causality checks (using 
time lags, shift share or other instruments). Equally, international comparisons of urban areas 
using CEL approaches could turn up fascinating results.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
      
Ave hourly wage 79 9.991 1.319 8.089 13.879 
Ave hourly wage, UK-born 79 9.993 1.342 8.112 14.557 
Ave hourly wage, non-UK born 79 10.292 1.615 6.52 14.318 
Ave hourly wage, ethnic minorities 79 9.779 1.608 5.932 14.394 
Ave employment rate 79 0.75 0.044 0.623 0.821 
Ave employment rate, UK-born 79 0.757 0.043 0.626 0.825 
Ave employment rate, non-UK born  79 0.683 0.091 0.312 0.81 
Ave employment rate, ethnic minorities 79 0.64 0.085 0.458 0.793 
% of unemployed who are long term 
unemployed 
79 0.198 0.06 0.081 0.347 
% of unemployed who are long term 
unemployed, UK-born 
79 0.199 0.061 0.082 0.347 
% of unemployed who are long term 
unemployed, non-UK born 
79 0.173 0.138 0 0.667 
% of unemployed who are long term 
unemployed, minorities 
78 0.157 0.133 0 0.5 
% aged 24 or less 79 0.165 0.014 0.132 0.198 
% female  79 0.497 0.008 0.48 0.522 
% male  79 0.503 0.008 0.478 0.52 
% non-UK born  79 0.076 0.046 0.017 0.339 
Fractionalisation Index of CEL name 
subgroups 
76 0.416 0.131 0.197 0.744 
Fractionalisation Index of CEL subgroups 
(excluding E/W/S/C) 
76 0.826 0.1 0.368 0.946 
Fractionalisation Index, country of birth  79 0.143 0.078 0.033 0.56 
Fractionalisation Index of non-UK born 
populations  
79 0.898 0.077 0.448 0.974 
% ethnic minority  79 0.06 0.054 0.009 0.273 
Fractionalisation Index, ethnicity  79 0.28 0.085 0.177 0.657 
Fractionalisation Index of minority populations 79 0.749 0.108 0.404 0.877 
% with NVQ4 (degrees / HE qualification) 79 0.242 0.053 0.146 0.373 
% with NVQ2 or 3 (A-levels / good GCSEs) 79 0.474 0.031 0.349 0.531 
% with NVQ1 (other / no qualifications) 79 0.284 0.048 0.197 0.402 
% in senior, pro or associate pro occupations  79 0.394 0.057 0.261 0.532 
% in admin and secretarial or skilled trades   79 0.245 0.016 0.208 0.292 
% in personal services, sales, routine or 
manual  
79 0.361 0.052 0.252 0.496 
% employed in service sector  79 0.5 0.05 0.368 0.639 
% employed in manufacturing  79 0.146 0.044 0.054 0.259 
% employed in other sectors  79 0.354 0.029 0.281 0.482 
population density  79 1245.296 807.77 294.335 5660.119 
working age population  79 119667.5 72034.46 48131.98 422820 
Source: ONS / LFS, ONOMAP 
     
Notes: Onomap data (which gives frac_name and frac_wnames) is missing for three TTWAs: Colchester, Preston, 
Tunbridge Wells 
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Table 2. Urban areas with the 20 largest values of the CEL Fractionalisation Index, 2001-6  
 
2001-6  2001-6 
TTWA name frac_name  TTWA name frac_wnames 
Glasgow 0.744  London 0.946 
Lanarkshire 0.724  Southampton 0.941 
Dundee 0.701  Oxford 0.936 
Edinburgh 0.698  Reading & Bracknell 0.924 
Aberdeen 0.689  Nottingham 0.921 
London 0.688  Guildford & Aldershot 0.920 
Swansea Bay 0.638  Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 0.920 
Cardiff 0.600  Peterborough 0.919 
Blackburn 0.591  Wycombe & Slough 0.915 
Birmingham 0.564  Cambridge 0.914 
Wycombe & Slough 0.552  Walsall & Cannock 0.914 
Bradford 0.551  Southend & Brentwood 0.913 
Luton & Watford 0.543  Bournemouth 0.910 
Wolverhampton 0.527  Brighton 0.908 
Newport & Cwmbran 0.524  Poole 0.903 
Liverpool 0.523  Hastings 0.901 
Leicester 0.522  Ipswich 0.899 
Manchester 0.515  Luton & Watford 0.897 
Coventry 0.511  Bedford 0.895 
Rochdale & Oldham 0.503  Northampton & Wellingborough 0.893 
  
   
All urban TTWAs 0.426  All urban TTWAs 0.816 
 
 
   
Source: ONOMAP 
Notes: right hand columns exclude ‘English’, ‘Welsh’, ‘Scottish’ and ‘Celtic’ CEL subgroups.  
Notes: based on UK presence, some CEL subgroups aggregate a number of smaller, disparate CEL types. See Appendix Z for full description.  
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Table 3 / Urban TTWAs with the 20 highest values of the country of birth Fractionalisation Index, 2001-6. 
 
2001 2006 2001-6 
TTWA name Fracm TTWA name fracm TTWA name fracm 
London 0.530 London 0.588 London 0.560 
Bradford 0.279 Wycombe & Slough 0.345 Wycombe & Slough 0.308 
Birmingham 0.276 Reading & Bracknell 0.326 Bradford 0.295 
Wycombe & Slough 0.257 Luton & Watford 0.323 Birmingham 0.272 
Leicester 0.255 Cambridge 0.322 Leicester 0.266 
Brighton 0.250 Birmingham 0.309 Luton & Watford 0.265 
Luton & Watford 0.244 Bradford 0.289 Reading & Bracknell 0.253 
Reading & Bracknell 0.226 Leicester 0.282 Bedford 0.241 
Bedford 0.226 Bedford 0.276 Cambridge 0.236 
Cambridge 0.215 Oxford 0.252 Guildford & Aldershot 0.215 
Guildford & Aldershot 0.211 Leeds 0.249 Brighton 0.213 
Huddersfield 0.203 Coventry 0.239 Oxford 0.207 
Oxford 0.186 Guildford & Aldershot 0.238 Wolverhampton 0.198 
Wolverhampton 0.180 Peterborough 0.230 Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 0.196 
Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 0.179 Wolverhampton 0.228 Leeds 0.195 
Rochdale & Oldham 0.173 Stevenage 0.228 Coventry 0.195 
Bournemouth 0.172 Bolton 0.218 Huddersfield 0.186 
Colchester 0.166 Brighton 0.215 Manchester 0.180 
Stevenage 0.161 Dudley & Sandwell 0.213 Bournemouth 0.178 
Leeds 0.156 Manchester 0.212 Rochdale & Oldham 0.176 
      
All urban TTWAs 0.130 All urban TTWAs 0.167 All urban TTWAs 0.143 
      
Source: ONS / LFS  
Notes: sample is working-age population  
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 Table 4. Urban areas with the 20 largest values of the ethnic groups Fractionalisation Index, 2001-6  
 
2001 2006 2001-6 
TTWA name frace_15 TTWA name frace_15 TTWA name frace_15 
London 0.579 London 0.648 London 0.657 
Birmingham 0.394 Birmingham 0.482 Birmingham 0.496 
Bradford 0.379 Bradford 0.404 Bradford 0.490 
Leicester 0.299 Wycombe & Slough 0.402 Leicester 0.425 
Luton & Watford 0.291 Luton & Watford 0.393 Bedford 0.404 
Wycombe & Slough 0.286 Reading & Bracknell 0.369 Luton & Watford 0.402 
Wolverhampton 0.280 Wolverhampton 0.362 Huddersfield 0.389 
Huddersfield 0.274 Leicester 0.361 Bolton 0.361 
Bedford 0.261 Bedford 0.359 Leeds 0.358 
Rochdale & Oldham 0.225 Bolton 0.353 Glasgow 0.349 
Bolton 0.211 Glasgow 0.350 Coventry 0.347 
Leeds 0.205 Dudley & Sandwell 0.319 Dudley & Sandwell 0.345 
Reading & Bracknell 0.203 Huddersfield 0.314 Manchester 0.340 
Blackburn 0.202 Cambridge 0.312 Blackburn 0.333 
Dudley & Sandwell 0.199 Leeds 0.310 Burnley, Nelson & Colne 0.321 
Brighton 0.195 Coventry 0.299 Cambridge 0.321 
Manchester 0.188 Nottingham 0.275 Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 0.317 
Burnley, Nelson & Colne 0.186 Southend & Brentwood 0.274 Derby 0.312 
Cambridge 0.186 Rochdale & Oldham 0.268 Gloucester 0.309 
Coventry 0.181 Manchester 0.267 Oxford 0.305 
      
All urban TTWAs 0.133 All urban TTWAs 0.203 All urban TTWAs 0.28 
      
Source: ONS / LFS  
Notes: sample is working-age population  
Notes: variable is drawn from LFS variable ETHCEN15. 
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Table 5. 50 largest CEL name subgroups, urban TTWAs, 2001-6. 
 
Onomap CEL subgroup % of all groups, 2001-6 Onomap CEL subgroup % of all groups, 2001-6 
ENGLISH 68.90 GHANAIAN 0.12 
CELTIC 11.63 HISPANIC 0.11 
SCOTTISH 5.42 JEWISH 0.10 
WELSH 2.89 SOMALIAN 0.10 
IRISH 2.82 OTHER AFRICAN 0.09 
PAKISTANI 1.05 OTHER EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC 0.09 
OTHER MUSLIM 0.79 HINDI NOT INDIAN 0.04 
INDIAN HINDI 0.78 INTERNATIONAL 0.04 
SIKH 0.55 JEWISH AND ARMENIAN 0.04 
UNCLASSIFIED 0.41 CZECH / SLOVAK 0.04 
ITALIAN 0.39 BALKAN 0.04 
POLISH 0.35 DANISH 0.04 
OTHER EUROPEAN 0.34 SWEDISH 0.04 
BANGLADESHI 0.33 DUTCH 0.03 
CHINESE 0.27 VIETNAMESE 0.03 
NIGERIAN 0.27 RUSSIAN 0.03 
GREEK 0.22 OTHER NORDIC 0.03 
GERMAN 0.21 BLACK SOUTHERN AFRICAN 0.02 
PORTUGESE 0.21 IRANIAN 0.02 
FRENCH 0.19 HUNGARIAN 0.02 
SPANISH 0.18 JAPANESE 0.02 
SRI LANKAN 0.14 FINNISH 0.02 
OTHER SOUTH ASIAN 0.14 SIERRA LEONIAN 0.02 
PAKISTANI KASHMIR 0.13 AFRIKAANS 0.02 
TURKISH 0.12 OTHER BALTIC 0.02 
Source: ONOMAP.  
Notes: based on UK presence, some CEL subgroups aggregate a number of smaller, disparate CEL types. See Appendix 1 for full description.  
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Table 6. 50 largest CEL name subgroups (excluding ‘English’, ‘Scottish’, ‘Welsh’, ‘Celtic’ subgroups), urban TTWAs, 2001-6. 
  
Onomap CEL subgroup % of groups, 2001-6 Onomap CEL subgroup % of groups, 2001-6 
IRISH 32.75 OTHER AFRICAN 0.60 
PAKISTANI 5.98 DUTCH 0.56 
EUROPEAN 5.68 CZECH / SLOVAK 0.55 
INDIAN HINDI 5.67 DANISH 0.51 
OTHER MUSLIM 4.67 SOMALIAN 0.50 
CHINESE 3.50 INTERNATIONAL 0.44 
POLISH 3.41 JEWISH ARMENIAN 0.38 
ITALIAN 3.35 HINDI NOT INDIAN 0.37 
SIKH 3.29 BALKAN 0.37 
GERMAN 3.27 OTHER NORDIC 0.34 
UNCLASSIFIED 2.87 SWEDISH 0.31 
BANGLADESHI 2.63 HUNGARIAN 0.28 
FRENCH 2.40 AFRIKAANS 0.22 
GREEK 2.14 BLACK SOUTHERN AFRICAN 0.21 
PORTUGESE 1.53 VIETNAMESE 0.20 
HISPANIC 1.38 FINNISH 0.20 
SPANISH 1.38 RUSSIAN 0.20 
NIGERIAN 1.16 OTHER BALTIC 0.19 
OTHER EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC 1.06 NORWEGIAN 0.18 
OTHER SOUTH ASIAN 0.84 IRANIAN 0.14 
JEWISH 0.76 JAPANESE 0.11 
PAKISTANI KASHMIR 0.74 SERBIAN 0.10 
GHANAIAN 0.68 ALBANIAN 0.09 
TURKISH 0.67 SIERRA LEONIAN 0.08 
SRI LANKAN 0.66 ARMENIAN 0.05 
Source: ONOMAP.  
Notes: based on UK presence, some CEL subgroups aggregate a number of smaller, disparate CEL types. See Appendix 1 for full description.  
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Table 7. 25 largest migrant groups, urban TTWAs, 2001-6. 
 
2001 2006 2001-6 pooled 
Country of birth % total migrants Country of birth % total migrants Country of birth % total migrants 
Germany 10.81 India 9.71 Germany 9.15 
India 9.17 Germany 7.13 India 9.15 
Ireland 8.64 Pakistan 7.03 Pakistan 7.73 
Pakistan 7.05 Ireland 6.00 Ireland 7.64 
South Africa 4.30 Poland 4.84 South Africa 4.61 
USA 3.22 South Africa 4.26 Bangladesh 3.03 
Bangladesh 3.06 Bangladesh 3.42 USA 2.87 
Canada 2.69 Zimbabwe 2.63 Australia 2.46 
Kenya 2.67 USA 2.58 Hong Kong 2.21 
Hong Kong 2.54 Former USSR  2.31 Zimbabwe 2.13 
Australia 2.17 Australia 2.28 Canada 2.10 
France 2.00 Hong Kong 1.95 Poland 2.04 
Singapore 1.95 Kenya 1.79 Kenya 2.00 
Italy 1.93 France 1.71 Singapore 1.71 
Jamaica 1.86 Philippines 1.69 Italy 1.67 
Nigeria 1.76 China 1.64 France 1.67 
Malta & Gozo 1.73 Singapore 1.53 Former USSR 1.54 
Malaysia 1.66 Canada 1.53 China 1.52 
Other M/East 1.35 Netherlands 1.50 Philippines 1.51 
Zimbabwe 1.30 Other M/East 1.49 Jamaica 1.47 
Poland 1.27 Cyprus 1.44 Cyprus 1.36 
Cyprus 1.23 Jamaica 1.43 Malaysia 1.32 
Other Africa 1.22 Italy 1.32 New Zealand 1.21 
New Zealand 1.16 Czech Rep 1.28 Other M/East 1.20 
Spain 1.12 Portugal 1.28 Malta & Gozo 1.18 
Migrants as % total 
working age population 
6.8 Migrants as % total 
working age population 
8.9 Migrants as % total 
working age population 
7.6 
      
Source: ONS / LFS 
Notes: sample is working-age population  
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Table 8. Largest ethnic groups, urban TTWAs, 2001-6. 
 
2001 2006 2001-6 
ETHCEN_15 group % of all groups ETHCEN_15 group % of all groups ethcen_15 group % of all groups 
    
  
White 92.82 White 88.73 White 79.68 
Other white 2.21 Other white 4.19 Other white 10.35 
Indian  1.38 Indian  1.66 Indian  1.39 
Pakistani 1.20 Pakistani 1.58 Pakistani 1.35 
Black Caribbean  0.57 Other    0.94 Other  0.60 
Other   0.33 Black African  0.60 Black Caribbean  0.49 
Black African  0.32 Black Caribbean  0.57 White and Bl Caribbean 0.44 
Chinese 0.29 Other Asian  0.47 Black  African  0.41 
Other Asian  0.23 Chinese 0.36 Bangladeshi 0.36 
Bangladeshi 0.22 Bangladeshi  0.29 Other Asian  0.34 
White and Bl Caribbean  0.21 White and Bl Caribbean  0.22 Chinese 0.33 
White and Asian  0.13 White and Asian  0.15 Other mixed 0.16 
Other Black  0.04 Other mixed  0.14 White and Asian  0.13 
White and Bl African  0.04 White and Bl African  0.06 Other Black  0.09 
Other mixed 0.02 Other black  0.04 White and Bl African 0.08 
    
  
Source: ONS / LFS  
Notes: Figures are based on ETHCEN15 variable.  
Notes: LFS figures suggest some errors in data collection during 2004 and 2005. These will bias down white and ‘other white’ figures for 2001-6 pooled.  
Notes: sample is working-age population  
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 Table 9. Diversity and wages, CEL names taxonomy measures. UK urban areas, 2001-2006.  
 
Hourly wages 
DIV = all subgroups DIV = subgroups less E / W /  S / C 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 div c c_all nl div c c_all nl 
         
DIV 0.114  -0.063 -0.074 0.585***  0.246** 0.238*** 
 (0.124)  (0.066) (0.067) (0.180)  (0.096) (0.089) 
         
youth_24  -2.130*** -1.804*** -1.528**  -2.130*** -1.984*** -1.768*** 
  (0.589) (0.655) (0.667)  (0.589) (0.624) (0.622) 
         
female  -1.146 -0.865 -0.836  -1.146 -0.154 -0.195 
  (0.980) (0.994) (0.907)  (0.980) (1.116) (1.014) 
         
hiskills  1.404*** 1.528*** 1.512***  1.404*** 1.401*** 1.373*** 
  (0.259) (0.294) (0.296)  (0.259) (0.266) (0.267) 
         
mf  -0.408* -0.328 -0.265  -0.408* -0.325 -0.274 
  (0.229) (0.279) (0.286)  (0.229) (0.261) (0.262) 
         
pop_density  0.000* 0.000* 0.000  0.000* 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
ltu_share_r  -0.145 -0.119 -0.150  -0.145 0.018 -0.017 
  (0.120) (0.123) (0.114)  (0.120) (0.131) (0.123) 
         
_cons 2.244*** 2.939*** 2.722*** 2.687*** 1.808*** 2.939*** 2.184*** 2.199*** 
 (0.053) (0.511) (0.544) (0.513) (0.149) (0.511) (0.612) (0.562) 
         
N 76 79 76 75 76 79 76 75 
F 0.841 28.544 23.273 21.851 10.515 28.544 23.236 21.233 
r2 0.014 0.723 0.718 0.707 0.219 0.723 0.740 0.729 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Source: ONS / LFS. 
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Table 10. Diversity and employment rates, CEL names taxonomy measures. UK urban areas, 2001-2006.  
 
Ave. empl. 
rate 
DIV = all subgroups DIV = subgroups less E / W /  S / C 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 div c c_all nl div c c_all nl 
         
DIV -0.130***  -0.133*** -0.131*** 0.305***  0.105** 0.108** 
 (0.048)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.087)  (0.048) (0.050) 
         
youth_24  -0.991*** -0.629* -0.676*  -0.991*** -1.094*** -1.151*** 
  (0.374) (0.349) (0.346)  (0.374) (0.359) (0.362) 
         
female  -1.814*** -1.350** -1.355**  -1.814*** -1.438** -1.428** 
  (0.686) (0.606) (0.614)  (0.686) (0.638) (0.645) 
         
hiskills  0.519*** 0.692*** 0.695***  0.519*** 0.488*** 0.496*** 
  (0.093) (0.106) (0.106)  (0.093) (0.091) (0.093) 
         
mf  0.109 0.142 0.131  0.109 0.090 0.077 
  (0.110) (0.101) (0.100)  (0.110) (0.107) (0.107) 
         
pop_density  -0.000** -0.000 -0.000  -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
ltu_share_r  -0.299*** -0.276*** -0.271***  -0.299*** -0.241*** -0.232*** 
  (0.073) (0.070) (0.072)  (0.073) (0.074) (0.077) 
         
_cons -0.236*** 0.707** 0.417 0.424 -0.542*** 0.707** 0.454 0.450 
 (0.022) (0.315) (0.289) (0.294) (0.074) (0.315) (0.316) (0.322) 
         
N 76 79 76 75 76 79 76 75 
F 7.435 41.455 40.840 38.341 12.262 41.455 54.154 51.805 
r2 0.078 0.721 0.782 0.781 0.252 0.721 0.754 0.755 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Source: ONS / LFS. 
 35
Table 11. Diversity, wages and employment rates: country of birth measures. UK urban areas, 2001-2006.  
 
 Hourly wages Employment rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 div c div_c nl div c div_c nl 
         
DIV 0.279*  0.210*** 0.280*** 0.184  0.088 0.150** 
 (0.148)  (0.054) (0.059) (0.148)  (0.053) (0.061) 
         
youth_24  -0.707* -0.822** -0.988***  -0.991*** -1.039*** -1.185*** 
  (0.407) (0.369) (0.357)  (0.374) (0.371) (0.361) 
         
female  -1.813** -1.652** -1.602**  -1.814*** -1.746** -1.702** 
  (0.726) (0.654) (0.641)  (0.686) (0.662) (0.653) 
         
hiskills  0.552*** 0.410*** 0.376***  0.519*** 0.460*** 0.430*** 
  (0.096) (0.093) (0.088)  (0.093) (0.096) (0.092) 
         
mf  0.171 0.148 0.107  0.109 0.099 0.063 
  (0.113) (0.109) (0.105)  (0.110) (0.111) (0.108) 
         
pop_density  -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000  -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
ltu_share_r  -0.323*** -0.282*** -0.251***  -0.299*** -0.282*** -0.255*** 
  (0.074) (0.072) (0.074)  (0.073) (0.074) (0.076) 
         
_cons -0.319*** 0.650* 0.602** 0.597** -0.315*** 0.707** 0.687** 0.682** 
 (0.021) (0.333) (0.296) (0.295) (0.021) (0.315) (0.303) (0.303) 
         
N 79 79 79 78 79 79 79 78 
F 3.546 30.813 32.604 30.096 1.546 41.455 35.364 32.597 
r2 0.139 0.685 0.723 0.739 0.058 0.721 0.728 0.736 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Source: ONS / LFS. 
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Table 12. Diversity, wages and employment rates: ONS ethnic group measures. UK urban areas, 2001-2006.  
 
 Hourly wage Employment rates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 div c div_c nl div c div_c nl 
         
DIV 0.582***  0.523*** 0.489*** 0.022  0.068 0.089* 
 (0.181)  (0.109) (0.115) (0.093)  (0.045) (0.049) 
         
youth_24  -2.130*** -2.717*** -2.555***  -0.991*** -1.067*** -1.170*** 
  (0.589) (0.598) (0.627)  (0.374) (0.364) (0.360) 
         
female  -1.146 -1.165 -1.161  -1.814*** -1.817*** -1.819*** 
  (0.980) (0.851) (0.812)  (0.686) (0.674) (0.675) 
         
hiskills  1.404*** 1.061*** 1.070***  0.519*** 0.475*** 0.470*** 
  (0.259) (0.227) (0.228)  (0.093) (0.093) (0.092) 
         
mf  -0.408* -0.622*** -0.576**  0.109 0.081 0.052 
  (0.229) (0.215) (0.224)  (0.110) (0.115) (0.116) 
         
pop_density  0.000* -0.000 -0.000  -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
ltu_share_r  -0.145 -0.074 -0.096  -0.299*** -0.290*** -0.277*** 
  (0.120) (0.111) (0.112)  (0.073) (0.074) (0.076) 
         
_cons 2.131*** 2.939*** 3.037*** 3.020*** -0.295*** 0.707** 0.720** 0.730** 
 (0.047) (0.511) (0.440) (0.423) (0.027) (0.315) (0.311) (0.315) 
         
N 79 79 79 78 79 79 79 78 
F 10.292 28.544 32.349 27.227 0.058 41.455 36.670 34.740 
r2 0.159 0.723 0.791 0.774 0.001 0.721 0.726 0.729 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Source: ONS / LFS. 
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Appendix 1. ONOMAP Cultural-Ethnic-Linguistic sub-groups  
 
AFRIKAANS LEBANESE 
ALBANIAN MALAYSIAN 
AMERICAN MUSLIM NORTH AFRICAN 
ARMENIAN MUSLIM STANS 
BALKAN NATIVE AMERICAN 
BANGLADESHI NIGERIAN 
BLACK OTHER AFRICAN 
BLACK SOUTHERN AFRICAN OTHER BALTIC 
CELTIC OTHER EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC 
CHINESE OTHER EUROPEAN 
CONGOLESE OTHER MUSLIM 
CZECH & SLOVAK OTHER NORDIC 
DANISH OTHER SOUTH ASIAN 
DUTCH NORWEGIAN 
ENGLISH PAKISTANI 
ERITREAN PAKISTANI KASHMIR 
ETHIOPIAN POLISH 
FINNISH PORTUGUESE 
FRENCH ROMANIAN 
GERMAN RUSSIAN 
GHANAIAN SCOTTISH 
GREEK SERBIAN 
HINDI NOT INDIAN SIERRA LEONIAN 
HISPANIC SIKH 
HUNGARIAN SOMALIAN 
INDIAN HINDI SPANISH 
INTERNATIONAL SRI LANKAN 
IRANIAN SWEDISH 
IRISH TURKISH 
ITALIAN UGANDAN 
JAPANESE UKRANIAN 
JEWISH UNCLASSIFIED 
JEWISH AND ARMENIAN VIETNAMESE 
KOREAN WELSH 
Source: ONOMAP.  
Notes:  
 
1) ‘OTHER MUSLIM’ subgroup includes CEL name types ‘BALKAN MUSLIM’, ‘MALAYSIAN MUSLIM’, 
‘MUSLIM INDIAN’, ‘SUDANESE’, ‘WEST AFRICAN MUSLIM’ and ‘OTHER MUSLIM’ (SMALLER 
MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES, N/AFRICAN COUNTRIES, CENTRAL ASIAN REPS) 
2) ‘OTHER SOUTH ASIAN’ includes CEL name types ‘ASIAN CARIBBEAN’, ‘BENGALI’, ‘BHUTANESE’,’ 
GUYANESE ASIAN’, ‘KENYAN ASIAN’, ‘NEPALESE’, ‘PARSI’, ‘SEYCHELLOIS’, ‘SOUTH ASIAN’ and 
‘TAMIL’ 
3) 'JEWISH' includes CEL name types ‘JEWISH / ASHKENAZI’ and ‘SEPHARDIC JEWISH’ 
4) ‘OTHER EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC’ includes CEL name types ‘BURMESE’, ‘CAMBODIAN’, ‘FIJIAN’, 
‘HAWAIIAN’, ‘LAOTIAN’,‘MAORI’, ‘MAURITIAN’, ‘POLYNESIAN’, ‘SAMOAN’, ‘SINGAPOREAN’, 
‘SOLOMON ISLANDER’, ‘SOUTH EAST ASIAN’ , ‘THAI’, ‘TIBETIAN’, ‘TONGAN’, ‘TUVALUAN’ and 
‘EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC OTHER’ 
5) ‘OTHER AFRICAN’ includes CEL name types ‘BENINESE’, ‘BOTSWANAN’ and ‘BURUNDIAN’, 
‘CAMEROONESE’, ‘GAMBIAN’, ‘GUINEAN’, ‘IVORIAN’, ‘KENYAN’, ‘LIBERIAN’, ‘MALAGASY’, 
‘MALAWIAN’, ‘NAMIBIAN’, ‘RWANDAN’, ‘SENEGALESE’, ‘SWAZILANDER’, ‘TANZANIAN’, 
‘ZAIREAN’, ‘ZAMBIAN’ and ‘ZIMBABWEAN’ 
6) ‘OTHER BALKAN’ includes CEL name types ‘BOSNIAN AND HERZEGOVIAN’, ‘BULGARIAN’, 
‘CROATIAN’, ‘MACEDONIAN’, ‘MONTENEGRIN’ and ‘SLOVENIAN’ 
7) ‘OTHER BALTIC’ includes ‘ESTONIAN’, ‘LATVIAN’ and ‘LITHUANIAN’  
8) ‘OTHER EUROPEAN’ includes CEL name types common to Andorra, Lichtenstein and other small states 
9) ‘INTERNATIONAL’ includes names common across a number of countries   
10) ‘OTHER NORDIC’ includes Sami and other indigenous Nordic groups.    
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Appendix 2. CRYOX country of birth categories  
 
UK / GB Angola 
Belgium Botswana 
Denmark Ethiopia 
France Egypt 
Germany Gambia 
Greece Ghana 
Irish republic Kenya 
Italy (excl. Vatican City) Libya 
Luxembourg Malawi 
Netherlands Mauritius 
Portugal Morocco 
Spain Nigeria 
Andorra South Africa 
Austria Sierra Leone 
Cyprus Seychelles 
Gibraltar Somalia 
Finland Tanzania 
Liechtenstein Tunisia 
Malta & gozo Uganda 
Norway Zaire 
Sweden Zambia 
Switzerland Zimbabwe 
Turkey Other Africa 
Former Yugoslavia Bangladesh 
Albania India 
Bulgaria Pakistan 
Former Czechoslovakia Iran 
Hungary Iraq 
Poland Israel 
Romania Lebanon 
Former USSR etc. Other Middle East 
Other Europe Burma Myanmar 
Barbados China 
Belize Hong Kong 
Canada Indonesia 
Other Caribbean Japan 
Cuba Korea 
Guyana Macau / Macao 
Jamaica Malaysia 
Trinidad & Tobago Philippines 
USA Singapore 
West Indies Sri Lanka 
Other Central America Vietnam 
Mexico Other Asia 
Other South America Australia 
Argentina New Zealand 
Brazil Caribbean Commonwealth 
Chile Other New Commonwealth 
Columbia Rest of the world 
Uruguay At sea / in the air [dropped] 
Venezuala Stateless [dropped] 
Algeria  
Source: LFS. 
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Appendix 3. ONS ethnic group categories   
 
ETHCEN15 categories 
British 
Other White 
White and Black Caribbean 
White and Black African 
White and Asian 
Other Mixed 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Other Asian 
Black Caribbean 
Black African 
Black Other 
Chinese 
Other  
Source: ONS. 
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